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First Impressions 
 
 
The following pages contain brief summaries of issues of first 
impression identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced 
between February 18, 2013 and September 4, 2013.  This collection, 
written by the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary briefly describes an issue of first impression, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the issue, not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting 
point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: First Impressions, 10 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2013). 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
Acosta-Ramirez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 712 F.3d 14 (1st 
Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether, under the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), the failure of a 
plaintiff to “comply with the sixty-day requirement to seek judicial 
review of the denial of [its] administrative claim also deprives courts of 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 20. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that a number of courts “have held 
that failure to comply with the sixty-day limit operates as a jurisdictional 
bar.”  Id. at 20.  Moreover, “the only judicial review . . . is for suits filed 
within sixty days of the disallowance or the expiration of the decision 
period.”  Id.  The court further reasoned that “[t]he provision’s plain 
language makes it clear that Congress wanted the rule to be 
jurisdictional . . . [the sixty-day limit helps create] an efficient process.”  
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that the failure of a plaintiff to 
comply with the statutory time period causes a jurisdictional barring of 
his or her claim.  Id. at 21. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether the jurisdictional limitation applies to 
suits made against a successor to a company placed in receivership or 
conservatorship by the FDIC pursuant to FIRREA.  Id. at 20. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that “the FIRREA administrative 
exhaustion requirement is based not on the entity named as defendant but 
on the actor responsible for the alleged wrongdoing.”  Id. at 20 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that if a bank is purchased 
by a new bank after becoming insolvent, a potential plaintiff cannot file a 
claim against the new bank, but must file a claim against the receiver 
who “succeeds as a matter of law to the rights, titles, powers and 
privileges of the failed bank, along with the responsibility to pay the 
failed bank’s valid obligations.”  Id. at 18. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that plaintiffs cannot sue the 
successor bank, but must instead file suit against the receiver.  Id. at 21. 
 
Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether an action brought by airline-affiliated 
skycaps under the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempts common-
law claims of unjust enrichment and tortious interference “based on the 
airlines’ imposition and retention of baggage-handling fees for curbside 
service[.]”  Id. at 62–63. 
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ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the text of the ADA 
preemption provision, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b), and found that, given its 
language, the court must determine whether the claim is based on a state 
“law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law” 
and “whether the claim is sufficiently related to a price, route or service 
of an air carrier.”  Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
reasoned that a baggage-handling fee for curbside service is part of the 
“price” and “service” referred to in the ADA’s preemption provision.  Id. 
at 64.  The court found that Supreme Court precedent interpreting 
preemption provisions places an emphasis on function over form, and 
that a suit at common law is backed by the weight of the state judiciary 
enforcing the state law and can “effectively strong-arm regulated entities 
to alter their business practices.”  Id. at 65.  The court further noted that 
Congress previously used words such as  “rule” and “standard,” which 
typically include common law to describe state law that could be 
preempted.  Id. at 66. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that, “to the extent that a 
state common law claim relates to a price, route, or service of an air 
carrier, it is preempted by the ADA.”  Id. 
 
Pagan-Colon v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2012)  
QUESTION: Whether overtime pay should be included in an award 
of backpay under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the FMLA provides that an 
employee may recover “any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other 
compensation denied or lost.”  Id. at 11.  The court reasoned that 
overtime “falls into the category of ‘other compensation.’”  Id.  The court 
stated that “for violations of other employment laws, . . . back-pay 
awards often include payment for overtime work that an employee would 
have performed but for her employer’s violation of employment laws.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “that a back-pay award under 
the FMLA may include overtime compensation.”  Id. at 5. 
 
Paolino v. JF Realty, LLC, 710 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a “pre-suit notice [that] identifies the potential 
plaintiffs, provides basic contact information, and allows the putative 
defendants to identify and remedy the alleged violations” constitutes 
sufficient pre-suit notice . . . before a citizen enforcement action may be 
brought under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA).”  Id. at 33. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that 40 C.F.R. § 135.3 prescribes the 
“required contents of pre-suit notice.”  Id. at 34.  The court stated that 
§ 135.3(a) requires “that pre-suit notice must permit ‘the recipient’ to 
identify the listed information, i.e., the specific standard at issue, the 
dates on which violations of that standard are said to have occurred, and 
the activities and parties responsible for causing those violations.”  Id. at 
37.  The court observed that the 7th and 9th Circuits have held that “the 
appropriate measure of sufficiency under § 135.3(a) is whether the 
notice’s contents place the defendant in a position to remedy the 
violations alleged.”  Id.  The court reasoned that “[t]he adequacy of the 
information contained in pre-suit notice will depend upon, inter alia, the 
nature of the purported violations, the prior regulatory history of the site, 
and the actions or inactions of the particular defendants.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit adopted the standard of the 7th and 
9th Circuits, and held that that pre-suit notice is sufficient when its 
“contents place the defendant in a position to remedy the violations 
alleged.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Fiume, 708 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a “two-level enhancement to the defendant’s 
guideline sentencing range (GSR) under USSG § 2A6.2(b)(1)(A), when 
superimposed upon a base offense level dictated by USSG § 2A6.2(a), 
constitutes an impermissible exercise in double counting.”  Id. at 60. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that it may be necessary to apply a 
single fact multiple times to sentencing guidelines because several 
sentencing adjustments routinely “derive from the same nucleus of 
operative facts while nonetheless responding to discrete concerns.”  Id. at 
61 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned that, given the 
guidelines’ “proclivity for indicating when double counting is 
forbidden,” the act is only considered impermissible if expressly 
prohibited therein.  Id. at 62.  The court found that, because a base level 
offense under USSG § 2A6.2(a) accounts only “for the general nature of 
the offense of conviction as one of stalking or domestic violence,” it may 
be necessary to employ a two–level upward adjustment pursuant to 
USSG § 2A6.2(b)(1)(A) in order to account for the enhanced violation of 
a protective order.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “that the use in tandem of a 
base offense level dictated by USSG § 2A6.2(a), and an upward 
adjustment under § 2A6.2(b)(1)(A), does not constitute impermissible 
double counting.”  Id. at 60. 
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United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s express consent is required for 
continuances sought by the defendant’s attorney which would entail a 
waiver of defendant’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act (STA).  Id. at 65. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the plain statutory language of the 
STA explicitly permits a defendant’s counsel to request continuances.  
Id.  In addition, the court looked to other circuits that have bound 
defendants to their counsel’s actions in the STA context based upon the 
principle that it would be “impractical” to have the clients express 
consent in every instance of waiver.  Id. at 66.  The court found this 
principal to be especially true with regard to trial management and 
scheduling matters.  Id. at 65. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “that in the ordinary course and 
within the confines of the STA exclusion provisions, defense counsel has 
the power to seek an STA continuance without first informing his client 
or obtaining his client’s personal consent.”  Id. at 66. 
 
United States v. Hogan, 722 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a “[defendant], who received a criminal 
history category (CHC) reduction at his original sentencing, is entitled to 
the application of the same or a similar reduction at re-sentencing under 
[18 U.S.C.] § 3582(c) in light of the newly-amended sentencing 
guideline, [U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2), and its commentary, Application 
Note 1.”  Id. at 59. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the plain language of 
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) instructs that “a court cannot reduce a defendant’s 
sentence under 18 U.S.S.G.. § 3582(c)(2) to a term that is less than the 
minimum of the amended guideline range determined under subdivision 
(1).”  Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that 
“[t]he only exception to this rule is found in § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B),” which 
states that “reductions comparably less than the amended guideline range 
are permitted only in cases where the original term of imprisonment was 
below the applicable guideline range pursuant to a government motion to 
reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities.”  Id.  (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th, 
and 11th Circuits and held that based on the statute’s plain language 
“§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) bars a district court from lowering a defendant’s 
below-guideline sentence unless the departure at his original sentencing 
was based on his substantial assistance to the government.”  Id. 
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SECOND CIRCUIT 
Federal Treasury Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport v. SPI Spirits Ltd., 726 
F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the phrase “legal representative” as used in 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(b) “denotes not merely one whom 
an appointing entity designates its ‘legal representative,’ but requires in 
addition that the appointing entity to be legally unable to bring suit on its 
own behalf.  Id. at 73. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act 
explicitly restricts standing to the “registrant,” “which the Act expressly 
defines as the owner[] or . . . his legal representatives, predecessors, 
successors and assigns[,]” while Section 43 allows suits “by any person 
who believes that [he or she is] likely to be damaged by the defendant’s 
actions.”  Id. at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
reasoned that the phrase could not be read broadly, as that would “permit 
both the registrant of the trademark and [its] putative legal representative 
to file separate suits against the same defendant for the same infringing 
act[,]” a result that is inconsistent with the stated intention of Congress to 
limit standing under Section 32(1).”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court further read the term “legal representative” as 
“requiring the trademark holder’s legally-recognized inability to assert a 
claim for infringement” in order for its interpretation to avoid a conflict 
with the requirements of Article III.  Id. at 81. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit concluded that “to serve as a ‘legal 
representative’ entitled to bring suit under Section 32(1) on behalf of a 
trademark holder, a putative plaintiff must demonstrate both its legal 
authority to represent the owner and that the trademark holder is legally 
incapable of representing itself.”  Id. at 82. 
 
Jones v. Smith, 720 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether dismissals of habeas petitions and appeals 
from habeas petitions, filed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–2255, are strikes 
under the three strikes provision within the meaning of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).  Id. at 143–44. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the three strikes provision intends 
to refer to “civil action or appeal” in the second half of the provision.  Id. 
at 146.  The court reasoned that this interpretation of the plain language 
was most consistent with the legislative history of the PLRA.  Id. at 147.  
The court noted that the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress 
was more concerned about “frivolous litigation by prisoners challenging 
their confinement,” and did not intend for the statute to apply to 
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challenges to the lawfulness or duration of criminal confinement.  Id. 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “dismissals of habeas 
petitions challenging the prisoner’s conviction or the duration of his 
confinement should not be considered strikes for the purposes of the 
PLRA.”  Id. 
 
Sokolowski v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 723 F.3d 187 
(2d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “Whether a party waives a challenge to the jurisdiction 
of a special adjustment board [under the Railway Labor Act (RLA)] by 
explicitly conceding before the board that the board has jurisdiction.”  Id. 
at 188. 
ANALYSIS: The court distinguished a plaintiff’s concession of the 
special adjustment board’s jurisdiction and a failure by plaintiff to raise a 
jurisdictional challenge before the National Railroad Adjustment Board 
(NRAB).  Id. at 191.  The court reasoned that “[w]hile a party cannot 
forfeit or waive an objection to the NRAB’s jurisdiction, a party can 
forfeit or waive an argument based on a special adjustment board’s 
jurisdictional limits because those limits were established by the parties 
themselves.”  Id.  The court noted that it “adopted a similar rule in the 
arbitration context.”  Id. at 191. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that a plaintiff waives a 
challenge to the jurisdiction of a special adjustment board by conceding 
before the board that it has jurisdiction . . . .”  Id. 
 
Unclaimed Property Recovery Service, Inc. v. Kaplan, No. 12-4030, 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17275 (2d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the holder of a copyright in a litigation 
document who has authorized a party to a litigation to use the document 
in the litigation may withdraw the authorization after the document has 
already been introduced into the litigation and then claim infringement 
when subsequent use is made of the document in the litigation.”  Id. at 
*5. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[l]itigation cannot be 
conducted successfully unless the parties to the litigation and their 
attorneys are free to use documents that are a part of the litigation.”  Id. 
at *6. The court noted that the “holder of the copyright in a document 
who authorizes a party to use that document in a litigation knows, or 
should know, [the] inevitable consequences of the authorization[,]” 
namely that subsequent use of the document would be likely, if not 
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necessary.  Id.  The court stated that”[o]nce a complaint is filed, it 
becomes a legally operative document that triggers the rights, process, 
and protections associated with civil litigation[,]” and as such, 
authorization to file the complaint may be treated  as if “the author has 
permitted the party to establish a legal action based on the complaint.”  
Id. at *9. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “an authorization [to use a 
copyright in a litigation document] necessarily conveys, not only to the 
authorized party but to all present and future attorneys and to the court, 
an irrevocable authorization to use the document in the litigation 
thereafter.”  Id. at *5–6. 
 
United States v. Okatan, 728 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the prosecution may use a defendant’s 
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination during a noncustodial 
police interview as part of its case in chief.”  Id. at 119 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that allowing a prosecutor to 
comment on a defendant’s invocation of their right against self-
incrimination poses a penalty on the user.  Id.  The court noted that 
“allowing a jury to infer guilt from a prearrest invocation of the privilege 
ignores the teaching that the protection of the [F]ifth [A]mendment is not 
limited to those in custody or charged with a crime.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “where . . . an individual 
is interrogated by an officer, even prior to arrest, his invocation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and his subsequent silence cannot be 
used by the government in its case in chief as substantive evidence of 
guilt.”  Id. at 120. 
 
United States v. Shellef, 718 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the Speedy Trial Act (STA), 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3161–3174, places a limitation on the time within which a district 
court may grant an extension for retrial pursuant to § 3161(e).  Id. at 102. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that § 3161(e) contains no language 
“temporally limiting the exercise of judicial discretion . . . .”  Id. at 103.  
The court reasoned that there was no reason to “preclude retrospective 
findings of impracticality to safeguard against the risk . . . that district 
courts will simply rationalize their actions long after the fact, in order to 
cure an unwitting violation of the Act.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court determined that the assumption that a court would 
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act in bad faith in making such determines about impracticality was 
unfounded.  Id.  The court distinguished its prior mandate that 
§ 3167(h)(7) continuances be granted only prospectively because the 
provision’s text and legislative history “plainly expressed Congress’ 
intent” of a prospective limitation.  Id. at 104.  Finally, the court 
reasoned § 3161(e)’s cap of 180 days on a trial judge’s ability to grant an 
extension rendered any comparison to § 3167(h)(7)’s temporal concerns 
unnecessary.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that neither the statutory text 
nor unwarranted concerns about the conduct of district courts support 
construing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) to limit the exercise of a district court’s 
extension discretion under that provision to the initial 70-day period for 
retrial.”  Id. at 105. 
 
Vidro v. United States, 720 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the United States may assert all defenses 
available to private persons” under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).  
Id. at 149. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that “the United States has waived 
its sovereign immunity for certain actions of its employees under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the 
act or omission occurred” through the FTCA.  Id. at 150 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that “the United States is 
liable for these tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as 
a private individual under like circumstances.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court further reasoned that “immunities and 
defenses are defined by the same body of law that creates the cause of 
action, [therefore] the defenses accessible to the United States in FTCA 
suits are “those that would be available to a private person under the 
relevant state law.”  Id. at 151. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “[i]n FTCA suits, the 
United States may assert common law defenses available to private 
individuals under relevant state law.”  Id. 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No. 12-4216, 2013 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 17283 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Clean Air Act preempts state law tort 
claims brought by private property owners against a source of pollution 
within the state.”  Id. at *2. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that in International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) the Supreme Court “found definitively 
that nothing in the Clean Water Act bars aggrieved individuals from 
brining a nuisance claim pursuant to the laws of the source State.”  Id. at 
*16–17 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned that there 
was “no meaningful difference” between the Clean Water Act and Clean 
Air Act’s savings clauses.  Id.  at *17.  The court noted that the 4th and 
6th Circuits “have also found no meaningful distinction  between the 
Clean Water act and the Clean Air Act.”  Id. at *20. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “[b]ased on the plain 
language of the Clean Air Act and controlling Supreme Court 
precedent . . . such source state common law actions are not preempted.”  
Id. at *2–3. 
 
Byrd v. Shannon, 709 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “‘strikes’ under [the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act of 1996 (PLRA)] can be accrued in actions or appeals where the 
prisoner has prepaid the filing fee, or whether strikes can only be accrued 
in [In Forma Pauperis (IFP)] actions or appeals.”  Id. at 215. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 6th, 7th, and 10th Circuits 
“have held that strikes may be accrued in actions or appeals regardless of 
whether the prisoner has prepaid the filinig fee or is proceeding IFP.”  Id.  
The court also stated that “[n]o court of appeals has held that strikes may 
only be accrued in IFP actions or appeals.”  Id.  The court reasoned that 
the language of PLRA has a “reasonably plain meaning.”  Id. at 216.  
The court noted that “action or appeal” refers to both IFP and non-IFP 
actions or appeals because the three-strikes provision of PRLA does not 
exclude actions or appeals where prisoners were not granted IFP status.  
Id.  The court posited that if Congress meant to differentiate between IFP 
and non-IFP actions or appeals, there would have been explicit language 
in the statute which would do so.  Id. at 217. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit adopted the position of the 6th, 7th, 
and 10th Circuits and held that both IFP and non-IFP actions count as 
strikes under the PLRA.  Id. at 215-17. 
 
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “the commercial-interest-based Predominant 
Use Test, the trademark-based Rogers Test, [or] the copyright-based 
Transformative Use Test” is best suited to resolve “conflicts 
between . . . [NCAA Football Players’] right of publicity and . . . [NCAA 
Football Video Game’s] First Amendment [rights].”  Id. at 153. 
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ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the Predominant Use Test, 
finding it “subjective at best, arbitrary at worst . . . ” and rejected it as 
“antithetical to our First Amendment precedent . . . .”  Id. at 154.  The 
court then considered the Rogers Test, and found it was “a blunt 
instrument, unfit for widespread application in cases that require a 
carefully calibrated balancing of two fundamental protections: the right 
of free expression and the right to control, manage, and profit from one’s 
own identity.”  Id. at 157.  The court noted that “the Transformative Use 
Test . . .  strike[s] the best balance because it provides courts with a 
flexible–yet uniformly applicable–analytical framework.”  Id. at 163.  
The court explained that “the Transformative Use Test maintains a 
singular focus on whether the work sufficiently transforms the celebrity’s 
identity or likeness, thereby allowing courts to account for the fact that 
misappropriation can occur in any market segment, including those 
related to the celebrity” and “requires a more circumscribed inquiry, 
focusing on the specific aspects of a work that speak to whether it was 
merely created to exploit a celebrity’s likeness.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the “Transformative Use 
Test is the proper analytical framework to apply to cases” involving 
“conflicts between the right of publicity and the  First Amendment.”  Id. 
at 165, 153. 
 
Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Development, Inc., 716 F.3d 736 
(3d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “a non-debtor company’s decision to abandon 
its classification as an ‘S’ corporation for federal tax purposes . . . is void 
as a postpetition transfer of ‘property of the bankruptcy estate,’ or is 
avoidable, under [Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.] §§ 362, 549, 
and 550 . . . .”   Id. at 741. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that in order “[f]or the [r]evocation 
[of a qualified subchapter S subsidiary (QSub) status] to be void 
under § 362 or avoidable under §§ 549 and 550, QSub status must be (1) 
property (2) of the bankruptcy estate” (3) that has been transferred.”  Id. 
at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that S-corp 
status is not a guaranteed right under the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) 
and while other courts have followed “a series of precedents holding net 
operating losses (NOLS) to be property,” “have value in a way that S-
corp status does not.”  Id. at 753–55.  The court further reasoned that 
“allowing QSub status to be treated as the property of the debtor 
subsidiary rather than the non-debtor parent . . . places remarkable 
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restrictions on the rights of the parent, restrictions that have no 
foundation in either the I.R.C. or the [U.S.] Code.”  Id. at 760. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “S-corp status is not 
“property” within the meaning of the Code” and that “even if [a 
subsidiary’s] QSub status were “property,” it is not properly seen as 
property of [the subsidiary’s] bankruptcy estate . . . .”  Id. at 758, 762. 
 
United States v. Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “Whether the [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(1) felon-in-
possession crime is a continuing offense.”  Id. at 378. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 6th, 7th, 9th and 11th Circuits 
have “uniformly held that [§ 922(g)(1)] is a continuing offense.”  Id.  
The court reasoned that “[p]ossession is generally understood as a course 
of conduct.”  Id.  The court posited that “by prohibiting possession 
Congress intended to punish as one offense all the acts of dominion 
which demonstrate a continuing possessory interest in a firearm.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted.) 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 6th, 7th, 9th, and 
11th Circuits and held “that the felon-in-possession crime in § 922(g)(1) 
is a continuing offense.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Graves, 722 F.3d 544 (3d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “a delay resulting from a competency 
proceeding extends until a hearing addressing the defendant’s 
competence is held, or just until the completion of a competency report” 
under the Speedy Trial Act (STA), 18 U.S.C. § 3161.  Id. at 547 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that under the STA, a “defendant’s 
trial must begin within 70 days of the public filing of the indictment or 
the defendant’s appearance before a judicial officer of the court, 
whichever is later.”  Id. at 546.  The court noted that the language of the 
STA excludes the “delay resulting from any proceeding, including any 
examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity 
of the defendant” from the 70-day calculation.  Id.  The court reasoned 
that “[b]y making clear that the time spent examining the defendant is 
included in the delay attributed more generally to a competency 
proceeding, that provision indicates that such a proceeding involves more 
than just the competency examination itself.”  Id. at 547. The court noted 
that “the use of the term ‘proceeding’ suggests judicial involvement, not 
solely the collection of evidence.”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the plain language of the 
STA demonstrates that the excludable delay extends beyond the 
completion of a competency report, which is “only one step in 
determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Stinson, No. 12-2012, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17478 
(3d Cir. Aug. 21, 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A), which provides 
for sentence enhancement if the defendant “derived more than 
$1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a 
result of the offense” requires that a financial institution must be the 
source of $1 million in gross receipts for the enhancement to apply.  Id. 
at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that before the 2001 amendment, 
the portions of the statue addressing financial institutions and portions 
addressing the derivation of $1 million from the offense had remained 
separate.  Id.  The court noted that the plain language of the amended 
provision merged the separate requirements, which lead the court to 
conclude that a financial institution must be the source of the gross 
receipts.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “§ 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) will 
apply when the evidence shows that a financial institution, not an 
individual, was the source of the $1 million in gross receipts” and that 
“[a] financial institution is a source of a defendant’s gross receipts if it 
owns the funds.”  Id. at *15, 8. 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
In re Lively, 717 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule, 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B), as amended by the BAPCPA [Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention Consumer Protection Act], applies in . . . individual 
debtor cases.”  Id. at 407. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that other courts’ handling of this 
issue has yielded two classes of interpretation.  Id. at 408.  The court 
noted that the 4th and 10th Circuit adopted a “narrow” interpretation, 
holding that the absolute priority rule was amended “so that individual 
debtors could exclude from its reach only their post-petition earnings and 
post-petition acquisitions of property, i.e., only property that was not 
already included in the Chapter 11 estate by § 541.”  Id. at 408–09.  In 
contrast, the court noted that the “broad” interpretation “holds that the 
exception’s (§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)) reference to property ‘included in’ the 
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individual debtor’s estate ‘under’ § 1115 subsumes or supersedes the 
§ 541 definition completely, thus [abrogating] the absolute priority rule.”  
Id. at 409.  The court reasoned that the narrow interpretation was 
“unambiguous and correct,” and that “the opposite interpretation leads to 
a repeal by implication of the absolute priority rule for individual 
debtors.”  Id. at 409.  The court opined that such an outcome was 
disagreeable because “repeals by implication are disfavored and will not 
be presumed unless the legislature’s intent is ‘clear and manifest.’”  Id. at 
410. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the individual debtor 
exception under Chapter 11’s absolute priority rule “plainly covers only 
the individual debtor’s post-petition earnings and post-petition acquired 
property.”  Id. at 409. 
 
Memorial Hermann Hospital v. Sebelius, 728 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “Whether mergers must constitute bona fide sales to 
qualify [for depreciation adjustment] under 42 C.F.R. § 413.134(I).”  Id. 
at 402. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that every circuit to consider the issue 
has held that mergers must constitute bona fide sales in order to qualify 
for a depreciation adjustment under 42 C.F.R. §413.134(I).  Id.  The 5th 
Circuit reasoned that due to the lack of evidence to warrant a circuit split 
and the unanimity among the circuits regarding this issue, it would join 
the other circuits.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “mergers must constitute 
bona fide sales in order to be eligible for depreciation adjustments under 
42 C.F.R. § 413.134(I).”  Id. at 408. 
 
Ngomi Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether, on summary judgment, “the ‘hearing de 
novo’ language [of 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c)] impels an evidentiary hearing or 
whether an FRCP [(Federal Rule of Civil Procedure)] 56 review 
suffices.”  Id. at 500. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, and 11th Circuits 
have found that a “hearing de novo” encompasses a FRCP 56 review.  Id. 
at  500–01.  The court noted that under  FRCP 81(a)(3) the FRCP “apply 
to proceedings for admission to citizenship to the extent that the practice 
in those proceedings” is not statutorily specified and has since adopted 
the practice in civil actions.  Id. at 501.  The court rejected the argument 
that § 1421(c)’s “vague reference” to a “hearing de novo” amounts to an 
alternatively specified practice.  Id. at 502.  The court stated that “de 
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novo” clarifies that “the deferential ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard 
[of review] often applicable to administrative reviews [did] not apply in 
this context,” because past practices in naturalization hearings, both 
before and after the Immigration of Act of 1990, have conformed to the 
FRCP.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held “that a ‘hearing de novo’ 
within the meaning of [§] 1421(c) encompasses an FRCP 56 review on 
summary judgment” and not an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 503. 
 
United States v. Renda, 709 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a contracting officer’s conclusion “that a 
government contractor is indebted to the government, rendered pursuant 
to the” Contract Disputes Act of 1978, as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–
7109 (the CDA), amounts to a “claim” under the Priority Statute, 31 
U.S.C. § 3713.  Id. at 481. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that the Supreme Court has 
instructed lower courts to give the Priority Statute a liberal 
interpretation . . . [and] that [a]ll debtors to the United States, whatever 
their character, and by whatever mode bound, may be fairly included 
within its reach.”  Id. at 481. (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). The court noted that other “courts have applied the priority 
statute to Government claims of all types.”  Id.  The court further 
reasoned that finality is not a requirement of the Priority Statute.  Id. at 
482. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “the term ‘claim’ 
encompasses a [contracting officer’s] determination that a government 
contractor is indebted to the government.”  Id. at 484. 
 
United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 
343 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the government may ever bring a suit 
under [41 U.S.C.] § 55(a)(1) [(the Anti-Kickback Act)] alleging an 
employer is vicariously liable for the kickback-related conduct of its 
employees.”  Id. at 347. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that a “corporation is only a legal 
entity and . . . cannot act or have a mental state by itself.”  Id. at 348 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned, “the acts and 
mental states of its agents and employees will be imputed to the 
corporation where such natural persons acted on behalf of the 
corporation.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).   The court 
concluded that “[s]ince [§] 55(a)(1) makes corporations liable for 
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kickback activity, it requires attributing liability to corporate entities for 
that activity under a rule of vicarious liability.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded “that § 55(a)(1) permits 
the government to attribute liability to corporate defendants vicariously.”  
Id. at 348. 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 
preempts a state failure-to-warn claim against a generic drug 
manufacturer that did not update its label “after the branded-drug 
manufacturer [of the same drug] strengthened the warnings on its 
label . . . .”  Id. at 580. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that it was required “to conduct a 
preemption analysis in accord with the principles of Wyeth and 
Mensing.” Id. at 583. It first evaluated the claim under impossibility 
preemption, “where it is impossible for a private party to comply with 
both state and federal requirements[,]” and found that as the generic 
manufacturer was required to comply with both federal and state 
requirements, impossibility preemption did not apply.  Id. at 584. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court then considered whether 
the claim was preempted because the state tort suit “would frustrate 
‘purposes and objections’ of Congress” and concluded that it would not.  
Id. at 585–86. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held “that state laws that provide for 
damages for inadequate warnings in violation of the federal duty of 
sameness do not conflict with federal drug policy[.]”  Id. at 586. 
 
Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905 (6th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a finding of fact made by a state agency 
acting in a judicial capacity has a “preclusive effect in collateral 
litigation brought” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where the defendant 
continues to dispute the factual matter.  Id. at 908. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that in University of Tennessee v. 
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a state 
administrative agency’s un-reviewed factual determination will be 
accorded the same preclusive effect as entitled to state courts “when a 
state agency acting in a judicial capacity resolves disputed issues of fact 
properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to 
litigate . . . .”  Id. at 912.  The court stated that the preclusive effect of the 
factual determination turned on whether the agency was “acting in a 
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judicial capacity[:]” and whether the “hearing officer resolved a disputed 
issue of fact[:]” and (3) if the matter was properly before it.  Id. at 912–
13. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court posited that if those 
elements are satisfied, the court “must give the agency’s finding of fact 
the same preclusive effect it would be given in state courts.”  Id. at 913. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that state court would accord 
preclusive effect to the agency’s finding of fact and, therefore, the 
agency’s determination must be given preclusive effect in the collateral 
federal litigation.  Id. at 917. 
 
United States v. Martin, 516 Fed. Appx. 433 (6th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) 
reflect “separate and distinct crimes or simply multiple means of 
committing a single offense” of money laundering.  Id. at 446. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 11th 
Circuits have held “that the subsections do not establish separate crimes 
but rather set forth two alternative bases for committing money 
laundering.”  Id. at 446–47.  The court reasoned that the two dependent 
clauses modify the same pronoun and contain the same conduct and 
standards of participation, and only differ as to the purpose of the money 
laundering stated therein.  Id. at 447.  The court noted that these 
provisions were unlike the “two dependent clauses separated by a 
disjunctive ‘or’” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the latter of which Congress later 
passed with the “inten[t] to delineate a new offense . . . .”  Id. at 447–48. 
CONCLUSION: The court held “§§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) 
are multiple means of committing the single offense of money 
laundering. Therefore, they may be charged in a single count . . . .”  Id. 
 
Vertrue v. Vertrue, Inc., 719 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [the unnamed plaintiffs] are entitled to 
tolling during the pendency of a prior putative class action suit[ ]” under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).  Id. at 477. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that there are three interpretations of 
§ 1367(d): the “substitution approach,” the “extension approach,” and the 
“suspension approach.”  Id. at 481.  The court reasoned that “[t]he 
substitution approach fails to give effect to state statutes of limitations, 
and the extension approach fails to give any operative effect to § 1367(d) 
in a number of cases in which the state statute of limitations does not 
expire during the course of federal litigation.”  Id.  The court also noted 
that the suspension approach “suspends the running of the statute of 
limitations . . . while the federal court is considering the claim and for 
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thirty days after the claim is dismissed.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit adopted the suspension approach 
and held that the suspension approach “properly gives effect to both 
§ 1367(d) and the state statute of limitations.”  Id. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Almutairi v. Holder, 722 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “an order from the [Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA)] resolving everything except an issue relating to 
voluntary departure satisfies the finality rules of the [Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (INA)].”  Id. at 1001. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “immigration statutes do not shed 
much light on the question” of whether an order resolving everything 
except voluntary departure is ripe.  Id.  The court attempted to analogize 
a BIA order resolving all issues except that of voluntary departure to 
civil litigations, stating that, “a case is not final until the district court has 
disposed not only of all theories of recovery, but also of all theories of 
relief.”  Id. The court reasoned that in the immigration context, “the 
‘final’ order might do no more than establish that the alien is removable: 
it need not . . . order immediate removal.”  Id.  The court recognized that 
the 1st, 4th and 6th Circuits have all addressed this issue as well, and 
found that an order from the BIA resolving all issues except that of 
voluntary departure “satisfies the finality rules of the INA . . . .”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit joined the 1st, 4th, and 6th Circuits, 
and held that “an order from the BIA resolving everything except an 
issue relating to voluntary departure satisfies the finality rules of the 
INA . . . .”  Id. 
 
CFTC v. Worth Bullion Group, 717 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a wholesaler qualifies as a “consumer finance 
institution” under the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 3401.  Id. at 549. 
ANALYSIS: The court first considered plain and ordinary meaning 
of “consumer finance institution,” as it is not explicitly defined in the 
RFPA.  Id. at 549–50.  The court found that the dictionary definition of 
“finance company” did not suffice, and instead choose to rely on the 
canon of noscitur a sociis.  Id. at 550.  The court reasoned that all of the 
“referenced entities surrounding the phrase ‘consumer finance 
institution’ in the RFPA’s definition of ‘financial institution’ . . . convey 
considerably more than a tangential or secondary relationship to the field 
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of financing.” Id. at 551.  The court further noted that the reason “these 
entities [exist] is to provide financing and cash loans to the general 
public, making these services a core function and purpose of [the 
business].”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “Congress did not intend 
‘consumer finance institution’ to include every retailer that extends 
financing to a percentage of its customers as part of its business . . . .”  
Id. 
 
Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785 (7th 
Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “estoppel based in part on the conduct of a 
non-party must comport with the exceptions to non-party preclusion” 
established in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), or whether 
“judicial estoppel is more flexible than the preclusion doctrines and can 
be applied regardless of whether the case meets an exception identified 
in Taylor.”  Id. at 795. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that “judicial estoppel is more 
flexible than the claim and issue preclusion doctrines that were the 
concern in Taylor.”  Id. at 796.  The court noted that judicial estoppel is 
not “reducible to any general formulation of principle” and consequently 
does not “lend itself to rigid rules.”  Id.  The court reasoned that when 
“considering judicial estoppel effects of a non-party’s conduct,” it is 
appropriate to “engage in an equitable inquiry that turns on the specific 
circumstances of an individual case.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the “applicability of 
judicial estoppel is not limited to the exceptions for claim and issue 
preclusion identified in Taylor.”  Id. 
 
Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, or to what extent, a federal district court 
can make choice of law determinations in conducting a fraudulent 
joinder analysis . . . .”  Id. at 671. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit noted “that the fraudulent joinder 
analysis allows district courts to ‘assume’ limited jurisdiction over an 
otherwise non-removable action to consider the viability of claims 
against an alleged fraudulently joined defendant.”  Id.  The court 
reasoned that “courts may not be absolutely precluded from considering 
choice of law questions that may arise in the fraudulent joinder context.”  
Id.  The court found that “the district court must necessarily predict what 
substantive law the state court would apply” in predicting whether there 
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was any reasonable possibility of a state court ruling against a 
fraudulently joined defendant.  Id.  The court reasoned that finding 
otherwise would allow a plaintiff to “potentially circumvent the 
fraudulent joinder doctrine by identifying any jurisdiction in the United 
States in which its claim against the alleged fraudulently joined 
defendant stood a reasonable possibility of success, even if the 
jurisdiction bore absolutely no relation to the case.”  Id. at 671–72. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “choice of law decisions 
can be made as part of the fraudulent joinder analysis where the choice 
of law decision is dispositive to the outcome, and where the removing 
defendant bears the same heavy burden to make the choice of law 
showing.”  Id. at 672 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “the parent with physical custody of a child 
commit[s] wrongful retention—colloquially, an ‘abduction’—by 
reneging on a promise, made under oath, to obey a newly entered 
custody order in favor of the other parent.”  Id. at 740. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit reasoned that the purpose of the Hague 
Convention is to “target international child abduction . . . and it is not a 
jurisdiction-allocation or full-faith-and-credit treaty.”  Id. at 741.  The 
court further reasoned that “a fundamental premise of the Hague 
Convention is that the interests of children are best served when they 
remain in their country of habitual residence while their parents resolve 
contested custody questions in the courts of that country.”  Id. at 742. 
CONCLUSION: The court held “the concepts of removal and 
retention can be understood only by reference to the child’s habitual 
residence: a legal adjustment of a parent’s custody rights does not by 
itself give rise to an abduction claim.”  Id. at 741–42. 
 
United States v. Mire, 725 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the Controlled Substance Act (CSA), 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 856(a)(1) violates the Due Process Clause because 
it “do[es] not provide sufficient notice to persons of ordinary intelligence 
that khat plants may contain cathinone or chathine and, therefore, may be 
illegal to possess.”  Id. at 672. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the issue was not “whether the 
statute was vague in and of itself” because although khat is not listed in 
the CSA or in the regulations, the statute “specifically provides that 
cathinone and chathine are controlled substances.”  Id. at 673.  Rather, 
the issue was whether the statute was “‘underinclusive,’ because persons 
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of ordinary intelligence would not necessarily know that khat is (or 
contains) a controlled substance even after reading the statutory text, as 
opposed to a statute that cannot be understood on its face.”  Id.  The 
court observed that, although “an ordinary person would not understand 
or generally know that khat contains two controlled substances,” a law’s 
vagueness may be mitigated by the offense’s scienter requirement.  Id. at 
673–74. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that where the criminal offense 
for which the defendant was convicted required “actual knowledge” that 
khat contained a controlled substance, any argument that application of 
the CSA would violate Due Process must fail.  Id. at 674. 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) was required to show that the officer acted “knowingly” in 
violation of SEC Rule 13b2-1 in a civil enforcement action against a 
former corporate officer for allegedly falsifying company records.  Id. at 
954. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 7th Circuit held that the SEC 
“has previously stated that there is no scienter requirement in SEC Rule 
13b2-1 because § 13(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act contains no 
words indicating that Congress intended to impose a scienter 
requirement.”  Id.  The court stated that the 2nd Circuit held that 
“Congress amended § 13(b) to provide that knowing falsification is 
required before criminal liability shall be imposed, plainly implying that 
falsification of the information to be filed in accordance with § 13(b) 
need not be knowing in order to lead to civil liability.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the SEC was only required 
to show negligence in the falsification of records under Rule 13b2-1.  Id. 
 
United States v. Behrens, 713 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the “no knowledge” defense to imprisonment 
contained in 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) requires proof that a defendant was 
aware of the specific SEC rule that was violated.  Id. at 929. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that it had “interpreted ‘willfully 
violates’ in . . . [the context of § 78ff(a)] as requiring proof of th 
‘intentional doing of wrongful acts,’ but not as requiring proof that the 
defendant knew of a particular securities law or SEC rule prohibiting his 
actions.”  Id.  The court determined that the “no knowledge” defense 
must offer “at least some but not all willful violators the added protection 
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of avoiding imprisonment” in order to be meaningful.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that, consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the language 
of § 78ff(a), the “no knowledge” defense “cannot be limited . . . to no 
knowledge of the existence of the pertinent SEC rule or regulation” or 
“no knowledge that the conduct actually violated the pertinent SEC rule 
or regulation.”  Id. at 929–30. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the best reading “of the no-
knowledge provision is to allow individuals to avoid a sentence of 
imprisonment if they can establish that they did not know the substance 
of the SEC rule or regulation they allegedly violated, regardless of 
whether they understood its particular application to their conduct.”  Id. 
at 930. 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
Corro-Barragan v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the meaning of “physically present” within 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(A), 
requires “uninterrupted physical presence in the United States for one 
year for an alien to be eligible for voluntary departure at the conclusion 
of removal proceedings.”  Id. at 1177. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined “physically present” by looking to 
the plain meaning of the statute, as well as the statutory history and 
legislative purpose, and concluded that the statute is unambiguous.  Id. at 
1178–79.  The court relied on the 11th Circuit’s prior reasoning and 
noted as a point of statutory construction that “Congress explicitly set 
forth special rules for the treatment of certain breaks in physical presence 
under § 1229b [cancellation of removal], and yet no exceptions are 
provided for breaks in physical presence under § 1229c(b).”  Id. at 1179. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “that [§ 1229c(b)] requires 
uninterrupted physical presence in the United States for one year for an 
alien to be eligible for voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal 
proceedings.”  Id. at 1177. 
 
County of Sonoma v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 710 F.3d 987 
(9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
directive to “government sponsored entities that purchase and securitize 
residential mortgages” (the Enterprises) “to discontinue purchasing 
[property assessed clean energy,] PACE-encumbered mortgages 
[(property assessed clean energy-encumbered mortgages)] is a lawful 
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exercise of its authority as conservator of the Enterprises.”  Id. at 988, 
992. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 2nd and the 11th Circuits have 
held that a “directive not to purchase PACE-encumbered mortgages was 
within the FHFA’s broad powers as a conservator.”  Id. at 992‒93.  The 
court reasoned that that FHFA has “all the rights, titles, powers and 
privileges of the Enterprises.”  Id. at 993.  The court also noted that the 
Housing Economic Recovery Act, “HERA[,] permits FHFA to take 
actions that are appropriate to carry on the business of the Enterprises 
and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the Enterprises.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further reasoned that 
“FHFA can, as conservator, take over the Enterprises and operate them 
with all the powers of the shareholders, directors, and officers of the 
Enterprises, and conduct all business of the Enterprises.  Id.  
Additionally, the court found that “[a] decision not to buy assets that 
FHFA deems risky is within its conservator power to carry on the 
Enterprises’ business and to preserve and conserve the assets and 
property of the Enterprises.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit agreed with the 2nd and 11th 
Circuits, and held that “[a]lthough FHFA’s powers as conservator are not 
limitless, the ability to decide which mortgages to buy is an inherent 
component of FHFA’s charge to preserve and conserve the Enterprises 
assets.”  Id. 
 
Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) “bars consideration of evidence 
designed to reconstruct the racial composition of the jury venire.”  Id. at 
1226. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[w]here a habeas petitioner 
alleges a Batson violation, courts are required to conduct side-by-side 
comparisons of the black venire panelists who were struck and white 
panelists allowed to serve to evaluate the merits of the claim.”  Id.  
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court also noted that “[i]f the 
state court has not performed this comparative juror analysis, we must do 
so in the first instance.”  Id.  The court reasoned that “[w]ithout knowing 
the race of each venire member – a fact visible to the state trial court but 
obscured by the cold record on review – it would be impossible to 
discharge this duty.”  Id.  Taken together, the 9th Circuit interpreted 
these two lines of precedent to conclude that Pinholster did not bar its 
consideration of evidence demonstrating the racial makeup of a 
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petitioner’s jury venire.  Id.  Rather, the court found that Pinholster was 
primarily concerned with preventing a federal habeas court from relying 
on evidence outside the state court record to reach its result.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “Pinholster allows us to 
consider photographs that show the racial composition of a jury venire to 
the extent that those photographs merely reconstruct facts visible to the 
state trial court that ruled on the petitioner’s Batson challenge.”   Id. at 
1227. 
 
K.M. V. Tustin Unified School District, 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “Whether a school meets the [Americans with 
Disabilities Act] ADA’s requirements for accommodating deaf or hard-
of-hearing students as long as it provides a [free appropriate public 
education (FAPE)] for such students in accord with § 1414(d)(3)(B)(iv)–
(v) of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA).”  Id. at 1100. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that it must examine IDEA’s 
FAPE requirement against Title II of the ADA’s communication 
regulations and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  Id.  From its 
comparative analysis, giving considerable deference to the Justice 
Department’s interpretation of Title II, the court found the ADA and 
IDEA requirements to be significantly different.  Id.  First, the court 
noted that “the factors that the public entity must consider in deciding 
what accommodations to provide . . . are different.”  Id.  Additionally, 
the court noted “Title II provides the public entity with defenses 
unavailable under the IDEA” and requires that public schools provide 
disabled students with an “equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy 
the benefits of . . . [the school] program,” which is not mandated by the 
IDEA.  Id.at 1101, 1096.  Based on these differences the court found that 
“in some situations, but not others, [a] school[]may be required under the 
ADA to provide services to deaf or hard-of-hearing students that are 
different than the services required by the IDEA.”  Id. at 1100. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “courts evaluating claims 
under IDEA and Title II must analyze each claim separately under the 
relevant statutory and regulatory framework.”  Id. at 1101. 
 
Logan v. U.S. Bank North America, 722 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act 
of 2009 (PTFA . . . ) provides a private right of action.”  Id. at 1165. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court first acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that private rights of action must be created by 
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Congress, either explicitly or implicitly.  Id. at 1169.  The court noted 
that the parties agreed that PFTA does not explicitly create a private right 
of action.  Id. at 1170.  The court reasoned that “[n]othing in the 
language and structure of [PFTA] reflects a clear and unambiguous intent 
to create a private right of action.”  Id.  at 1171. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the PFTA does not provide 
for a private right of action because Congress neither explicitly nor 
implicitly created the right.  Id. at 1173. 
 
Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G., 724 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether incorporation of the UNCITRAL [(United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law)] rules into the parties’ 
arbitration provision constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the 
parties intended to arbitrate arbitrability.” Id. at 1073. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the 2nd and D.C. Circuits 
“have concluded that incorporation of the 1976 UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that parties to an 
agreement intended to arbitrate questions of arbitrability.”  Id.  The court 
noted that “incorporation of the American Arbitration Association’s 
(AAA) arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that 
the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”  Id. at 1074.  The court 
reasoned that the AAA rules and UNCITRAL rules both contain similar 
“jurisdictional provision[s],” which further demonstrated the consistency 
of both rules’ application.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “as long as an arbitration 
agreement is between sophisticated parties to commercial contracts, 
those parties shall be expected to understand that incorporation of the 
UNCITRAL rules delegates questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”  
Id. at 1075. 
 
Saesee v. McDonald, 725 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether “defense counsel’s unfulfilled promise to 
produce a witness at trial [during an opening statement] could constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel” under the principles of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).  Id. at 1048. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that under the Strickland standard, 
defendant must establish counsel’s “deficient performance and prejudice 
in order to prove that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that counsel 
must, however, make a promise before the prejudice prong can be 
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satisfied.  Id. at 1050.  The 9th Circuit found that counsel’s statement that 
they were “counting on [the witness] to tell the truth and corroborate 
what the girl said—was not a promise that the [witness] would definitely 
testify, but rather an expression of hope that the [witness] might in fact 
appear.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that it was not reasonable to 
find that counsel’s statement did not amount to a promise and that 
therefore the failure to produce a witness at trial did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the principles of Strickland.  Id. 
 
Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant “satisfies the requirements to 
establish ‘good faith reliance’” under 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e) and how to 
interpret the legal definition of the same.  Id. at 1180–81. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned “the test of good faith reliance 
under § 2707(e) should contain both an objective and subjective 
element.”  Id. at 1180.  The court noted that a defendant cannot benefit 
from the “good faith defense” if the defendant “actually knew that the 
subpoena (or other process) was invalid under the applicable law.”  Id. at 
1181. The court noted that determining whether a defendant satisfies the 
“good faith reliance” test is a “mixed question of law and fact.”  Id.  The 
defendant’s actual knowledge that the subpoena was invalid is a question 
of fact, while the question of “whether defendant’s belief in the validity 
of the subpoena was objectively reasonably is a mixed question of law 
and fact.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the good faith defense 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e) is met when the defendant complies with a 
subpoena (or other process detailed in § 2707(e) of the SCA) that appears 
valid on its face, in the absence of any indication of irregularity sufficient 
to put the defendant on notice that the subpoena may be invalid or 
contrary to applicable law.”  Id. at 1180–81. 
 
SEIU v. National Union of Healthcare Workers, 711 F.3d 970 (9th 
Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [29 U.S.C.] § 501 of the Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act [(LMRDA)] creates a 
fiduciary duty to the union as an organization, not merely the union’s 
rank-and-file members.”  Id. at 975. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that under the LMRDA, “officers 
of labor unions are held to the highest standards of responsibility and 
ethical conduct in administering the affairs of the union.”  Id. at 978.  
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The court stated that the “statutory language [§ 501(a)] explicitly 
highlights the duty of union officers to the organization itself, not merely 
the union’s members.”  Id. at 980.  The court further noted that, “if 
statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent 
and consistent, judicial inquiry must cease.”  Id. at 979. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “§ 501 . . . creates a 
fiduciary duty the union as an organization, not merely the union’s rank-
and-file members.”  Id. at 975. 
 
United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a prohibited purpose can be fairly described 
as a “primary or principal” use of the premises in order to apply a 
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).  Id. at 729, 731. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 8th Circuit recently considered 
the issue in discussing whether a defendant used the premises primarily 
as a family home or for a collateral purpose of selling drugs.  Id. at 729.  
The court found the 8th Circuit persuasive, reasoning that “the 
application note’s call to compare the frequency of illegal and legal 
activities at premises leads to odd results when the premises also serve as 
a primary residence.”  Id. The court further noted that while it’s own 
“case law holds that under § 856, the illicit use need not be the sole 
purpose,” other circuits have “further explained that in the residential 
context, the manufacture (or distribution or use) of drugs must be at least 
one of the primary or principal uses to which the house is put.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court concluded that “in a 
residential case, a mere comparing of frequencies does not alone answer 
the question” given the similarity in language of § 856(a)(1).  Id. at 731. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that it would “consider both the 
frequency the prohibited uses occurred on the premises and whether 
those uses were significant in scope” in tandem in determining “whether 
the prohibited purpose can be fairly described as a primary or principal 
use of the premises.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2013)  
QUESTION: Whether a superseding indictment under the Speedy 
Trial Act (STA) requires the seventy-day speedy trial time period to start 
over.  Id. at 1089. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at the language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(c)(1), which creates the seventy-day clock, and found it does not 
provide a plain answer.  Id. at 1090.  The court then considered other 
aspects of the STA, finding that the government’s obtaining a 
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superseding indictment is somewhat analogous to the “government’s 
choice to have an indictment dismissed and recharged.”  Id. The court 
stated that for reindictments, the initial seventy-day clock still applies, 
but it is slowed by section 3161(h)(5), which excludes from the 
applicable speedy-trial clock “any period of delay from the date the 
charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to 
run as to the subsequent charge” for offenses that are the same or are 
required to be joined with that offense.  Id.  The court reasoned that this 
language suggests that separate and distinct charges brought by 
superseding indictment are both ineligible for exclusion and subject to 
the initial clock or “they stand on their own and are subject to a new 
timing period under section 3161(c)(1).”  Id.  The court found the 5th 
Circuit’s discussion on this point instructive, which recognized that when 
charges do not have to be joined, the government “may obtain a fresh 
speedy trial clock by [] waiting [for the] completion of the prosecution 
for charges in the original indictment” and then begin a new prosecution 
on the additional charges.  Id. at 1091. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “charges in a superseding 
indictment not required to be joined with the original charges come with 
a new [70]-day clock under the [STA].”  Id. 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
ComTran Group, Inc. v. U.S. DOL, 722 F.3d. 1304 (11th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether it is “appropriate to impute a supervisor’s 
knowledge of his own violative conduct to his employer under the 
[Occupational Health and Safety Act], thereby relieving the Secretary of 
Labor (Secretary) of her burden to prove the knowledge element of her 
prima facie case[.]” Id. at 1306. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that because the “supervisor acts as 
the ‘eyes and ears’ of the absent employer[,]” it would be reasonable to 
hold the employer liable for the supervisor’s conduct as though the 
employer had knowledge of the violative conduct.  Id. at 1317.  The 
court determined that the “rogue conduct” of a supervisor “cannot be 
imputed to the employer,” but rather that the Secretary must establish the 
“employer’s actual knowledge, or . . . constructive knowledge based on 
the fact that the employer could . . . foresee the unsafe conduct of the 
supervisor that is, through evidence of lax safety standards.”  Id. at 1316. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “[i]f the Secretary seeks to 
establish that an employer had knowledge of misconduct by a supervisor, 
she must do more than merely point to the misconduct itself. To meet her 
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prima facie burden, she must put forth evidence independent of the 
misconduct.” Id. at 1318. 
 
Lindley v. FDIC, No. 12-12015, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17019 (11th 
Cir. Aug. 16, 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether, under § 1819(b)(2)(A), a district court “has 
jurisdiction over a pendent state law claim that the FDIC has removed to 
the District Court when the FDIC is later dismissed from the case . . . .” 
Id. at *27. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the “[t]he language of 
§ 1819(b)(2)(A), the legislative history of FIRREA, [Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act], other canons of 
statutory construction, [the circuit’s] own precedent, and the weight of 
persuasive authority from other Circuits” to reach its interpretation.  Id. 
at *35.   The court reasoned that “the terms of 12 U.S.C. § 1819 evince a 
clear congressional intent to provide a federal forum when the FDIC is 
made a party to state court litigation.”  Id. at *30. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court found that “[t]hese purposes are better served 
if § 1819(b)(2)(A)’s use of ‘is a party’ means that the FDIC need only be 
a party at the time the case is filed in order to establish jurisdiction over 
all pendent claims.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit joined the 2nd, 5th, and 8th 
Circuits and concluded that “when the FDIC is a party to a civil suit and 
removes that case to federal court, the District Court has original 
jurisdiction over claims against non-FDIC defendants, and this 
jurisdiction is not lost if the FDIC is later dismissed from the case.”  Id. 
at *35. 
 
MDS (Canada), Inc. v. RAD Source Technologies, Inc., 720 F.3d 833 
(11th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a breach of contract claim that would 
require the resolution of a claim of patent infringement for the 
complainant to succeed.”  Id. at 837–38. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[b]ecause this action was filed 
before Congress passed the America Invents Act of 2011, it [was] 
governed by a statute that granted the Federal Circuit exclusive 
jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the 
United States if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in 
part, on section 1338.”  Id. at 841 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The court noted that Supreme Court precedent dictates that § 1338 must 
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be interpreted in tandem with § 1331, granting federal question 
jurisdiction, because both statues use the term “arising under.”  Id.  The 
court found that the factors of the substantiality inquiry in Grable & Sons 
Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 
308 (2005), “establish that the issue of patent infringement here is not a 
substantial federal question for the purpose of section 1338.”  Id. at 842.  
The court reasoned that “[t]o hold all questions of patent infringement 
are substantial questions of federal law for the purposes of federal patent 
jurisdiction would sweep a number of state-law claims into federal 
court.”  Id. at 843. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “the Federal Circuit [does 
not have] exclusive jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a breach of contract 
claim that would require the resolution of a claim of patent infringement 
for the complaint to succeed.”  Id. at 837–38, 856. 
 
Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876 (11th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant has the right, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(11), 1441, and 1453, to remove multiple and separate 
lawsuits to federal court as mass actions if the lawsuits in the aggregate 
contain 100 or more plaintiffs whose claims revolve around common 
questions of law or fact, but neither the plaintiffs nor the state court have 
proposed that 100 or more persons’ claims be tried jointly.”  Id. at 878. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that under § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), the 
plaintiff, the defendant or the state court acting sua sponte may make a 
proposal to try the claims jointly.  Id. at 881. The court went on to note 
that the “structure of the exceptions to removal jurisdiction carved out by 
the [Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)] . . . ,bars removal of suits where 
the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned that the statute’s text and 
structure make clear “that the plaintiffs can propose a joint trial, either by 
naming 100 or more plaintiffs in a single complaint or by their litigation 
conduct at any time prior to defendants’ removal of their action to federal 
court.”  Id.  The court further noted, “the burden of showing that 
plaintiffs proposed a joint trial rests with the removing defendant.”  Id. at 
882.  The court stated “[a]bsent a proposal or perhaps a sua sponte court 
determination, [ ] the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the plaintiffs’ claims.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held “that plaintiffs have the ability 
to avoid § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) jurisdiction by filing separate complaints 
naming less than 100 plaintiffs and by not moving for or otherwise 
proposing joint trial in the state court.”  Id. at 884. 
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Sunbeam TV Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 1264 
(11th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “Whether, to establish antitrust standing, . . . [a] 
customer[], must establish the existence of a willing and able competitor 
that would have entered the relevant market and competed with . . . [the 
incumbent], but for . . . [the incumbent’s] exclusionary conduct . . . .”  Id. 
at 1270. 
ANALYSIS: The court found the standard set forth by the D.C. 
Circuit and adopted by the district court to be persuasive and convincing 
precedent on the issue.  Id. at 1273.  The court, in adopting that standard, 
stated that similar to a would-be entrant suing an incumbent firm, “a 
would-be purchaser [customer] suing an incumbent monopolist for 
excluding a potential competitor from which it might have brought a 
product at a lower price must prove the excluded firm was willing and 
able to supply it but for the incumbent’s firm exclusionary conduct.”  Id. 
at 1272. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th circuit held that “[w]hether or not the 
plaintiff is a customer or a competitor . . . the plaintiff must prove the 
existence of a competitor willing and able to enter the relevant market, 
but for the exclusionary conduct of the incumbent monopolist.”  Id. at 
1273. 
 
United States v. Cruz, 713 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 precludes a sentence 
enhancement for the use or possession of device-making equipment, 
when a defendants is “already subject to a two-year mandatory sentence 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A for aggravated identity theft.”  Id. at 602. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at the text of the applicable 
Guidelines sections, § 2B1.1(b)(10) and the commentary to § 2B1.6, 
noting that § 2B1.6 limits the application of § 2B1.1(b)(10) to avoid 
double-counting.  Id. at 605–06.  The court noted that the “[1st] and [8th] 
Circuits, however, have held that § 2B1.6 is not an across-the-board bar 
on applying § 2B1.1(b)(10) enhancements to defendants convicted under 
§ 1028A.”  Id. at 606.  The court stated that, “[a] plain reading of 
[§ 2B1.6] commentary makes clear that the use of device-making 
equipment is not the type of relevant conduct,” precluded from 
enhancement by § 2B1.6.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that sentence enhancement 
under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A)(1) for possession or use of device-making 
equipment is not precluded by § 2B1.6.  Id. at 607. 
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D.C. CIRCUIT 
Lesesne v. Doe, 712 F.3d 584 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)’s 
exhaustion requirement, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(h), is a prerequisite for a 
plaintiff who, although no longer a prisoner at the time the complaint 
was filed, failed to exhaust all administrative remedies while an inmate.  
Id. at 585. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the § 1997e(h) analysis “is an 
obvious, straightforward legal question that does not require further 
factual development.”  Id. at 588. The court noted that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement, which states that a prisoner must exhaust all 
administrative remedies before filing a formal complaint, is not required 
if the complaint is filed after the prisoner is released from jail.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit held that the PLRA exhaustion 
requirement does not apply to a plaintiff who is not a prisoner at the time 
the complaint is filed, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff exhausted 
all administrative remedies while in prison.  Id. at 589. 
 
United States v. Spencer, 720 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether the phrase “term of supervised release 
authorized by statute” at the beginning of 18 U.S.C.S. § 3583(e)(3) “caps 
the aggregate amount of revocation imprisonment at the amount of 
supervised release” under the provision.  Id. at 368. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the plain language of the 
statute was unambiguous, thus the court “must give effect to its plain 
meaning.”  Id. at 369.  The court explained that the phrase “on any such 
revocation,” added in the 2003 amendment to § 3583(e)(3), modifies the 
phrase “term of supervised release authorized by statute.”  Id. at 370.  
The court noted that “had Congress intended the first half of § 3583(e)(3) 
to require aggregation, it would not have amended the second half of the 
statute to preclude such an interpretation.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit held that “upon each revocation of 
supervised release, a defendant may be sentenced to the felony class 
imprisonment limits at the end of § 3583(e)(3), without regard to prison 
time previously served for revocation of supervised release in the same 
case.”  Id. 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
Abbott Laboratories. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [35 U.S.C.] Section 24 empowers a district 
court to issue a subpoena in an inter partes reexamination proceeding, in 
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the absence of PTO [(Patent and Trademark Office)] regulations 
allowing parties to take testimony by deposition in such proceedings.”  
Id. at 1320. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that § 24 allows a district court clerk to 
issue subpoena’s for “any contested case in the PTO.” Id. at 1322.  The 
court states that it defines “contested case” “in light of its plain text and 
relationship with adjacent provisions of Title 35, its legislative history, 
and the interpretation given to it by other courts.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held 
that “[s]ince the PTO does not provide for depositions in inter partes 
reexamination proceedings, such proceedings are not ‘contested cases’ 
within the meaning of Section 24, and subpoenas under Section 24 are 
not available.”  Id.  at 1320. 
 
